To attract time deposits, more than 6,000 banks post their offer rates. I document large and persistent cross-sectional dispersion, on average negative spreads over Treasuries, and asymmetric rigid adjustments in these rates. Estimates of an oligopoly model reveal a large fraction of high search cost, and a small declining fraction of low search cost investors. Despite estimates of high intertemporal elasticity of substitution and recent technological innovations, the non-declining fraction of high search cost depositors, likely elderly households, grants banks significant monopoly power and allows for sluggish pass-through of increases in the Federal funds rate into deposit rates.
Introduction
Since the seminal work by Stigler [1961] , it is well understood that even small search costs can generate first-order effects in the behavior of prices, quantities, and welfare in otherwise homogeneous product markets with potentially large number of competitors. I study the systematic violation of the law of one price in the market for FDIC insured certificates of deposit (CD) or time deposits-a large and important component of the M2 monetary aggregate, and a close substitute for a Treasury security. On average, banks pay significantly lower rates on time deposits as compared to matched maturity Treasury bonds. Furthermore, within narrowly defined geographic markets, there is an economically significant rate dispersion. Finally, deposit rates adjust rigidly and asymmetrically to changes in market rates-deposit rates respond sluggishly to increases and adjust flexibly to decreases in Treasury yields. These patterns can be observed in Figure (1) and are documented in detail in Section (2).
To rationalize the observed rate dispersion, I examine a model of oligopolistic competition for deposits with heterogeneous search cost investors. The presence of search costs allows banks to sustain rate dispersion as a mixed strategies equilibrium of Burdett and Judd [1983] . 1 Differences in search costs lead to market segmentation according to investors' search intensity. Segments with high search costs remain rationally uninformed about the presence of better returns. The relative size of uninformed investors determines the equilibrium price dispersion, monopoly profits, and the degree of interest rate pass-through to deposit rates.
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model reveal a bimodal distribution of search costs with two distinct groups of investors-an uninformed group with large search costs and an informed group with low search costs. More than one third of investors implied by the model are uninformed investors. These investors have search costs ranging from 30 basis points to as high as 140 basis points. Depending on the marginal value of search, a significant fraction of high search cost investors switch between examining one offer and comparing rates of at most two banks.
Informed investors have low enough search costs, and are able to identify and act upon the best rates in their market. This segment gradually declines during the sample period from slightly above 10 percent in 1997 to below 5 percent in 2016. The trend is puzzling as, over the period, there has been rapid introduction of information technologies such as the Internet or mobile banking that should have eased information gathering and reduced transaction costs. Elderly households, who form the bulk of investors in time deposits, have 1 A large and growing theoretical and empirical literature rationalizes the observed price dispersion in homogeneous product markets with the presence of costly information acquisition. An excellent summary can be found in Baye, Morgan, and Scholten [2006] . The exit of low search cost investors implied by the structural estimates of the model is related to Hortaçsu and Syverson [2004] who document the existence of sizable dispersion in fees charged by retail mutual funds. Hortaçsu and Syverson [2004] attribute the fee dispersion to the presence of search costs and recent entry of high search cost novice investors. These developments in the retail mutual fund industry could be related to the exit of low information cost investors from time deposits and their entry into mutual funds where these novice investors face large information costs. I provide evidence that banks used their affiliated money market mutual funds to price discriminate between high search cost depositors, who continue to invest in time deposits, and the active segment of investors, who are likely steered into bank-affiliated funds.
The documented stylized facts extend results from previous empirical studies on deposit rates. In particular, Diebold and Sharpe [1990] examine the pass-through of wholesale interest rates into the pricing of retail deposit rates in the immediate post-Regulation Q period and are the first to document the rigid response of retail deposit rates to the variation in the wholesale market interest rates. 2 Hannan and Berger [1991] and Neumark and Sharpe [1992] document the asymmetric rigidity of deposit rates to changes in the marginal cost of funds of banks and relate the magnitude of these rigidities to the degree of local market competition. Driscoll and Judson [2013] extends this literature to test theories on price rigidity. Their conclusion is that the existing models based on firm menu costs face a challenge in fitting some of the unique characteristics of the price setting behavior of deposit rates. A recent paper by Honka, Hortaçsu, and Vitorino [2016] examines the effect of advertisement on shopping for bank deposits. Their modeling strategy, however, requires them to work with extreme value type I distribution of interest rates, which does not match the empirical distribution of rates. Furthermore, their survey data are limited to a single point in time in a low rate environment with compressed dispersion. As a result their search cost estimates are biased to be very low.
Building on this existing literature, first, I introduce a much more detailed micro-level data. Second, I provide a theoretical framework that can rationalize the pricing facts.
Unlike previous research on deposit pricing and interest pass-through, the focus in this paper is on the resulting rate dispersion, and its time-variation, both of which have not been previously explored. 
Deposit pricing within banking conglomerates
Deposit pricing within multi-branch and multi-market banking organizations is decentralized. Special rate-setting branches determine the rates for all branches in well-defined geographic areas. Table (1) shows the coverage of the rate-setting branches of the ten largest bank holding companies in 2007. Rate-setting branches are a small number relative to the total number of branches. For example, Bank of America designates 33 branches to set the rates for the remaining 5,370 branch locations and, on average, a rate-setting branch sets the rates in 160 branch locations. Most banks designate one rate-setting branch per state.
The average deposit-weighted distance between a rate-setting branch and its subordinate locations is relatively short, ranging between 38 km (23 mi) to about 150 km (93 mi). As a result of this decentralized pricing, there is no dispersion in rates among the branches of the same bank within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). For the rest of the analysis, I define a geographic market to correspond to a MSA area. 4 3 RateWatch deposit rate data http://www.rate-watch.com/; Summary of Deposit data http://www2. fdic.gov/sod/; Call Reports and bank holding company data https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/; Survey of Consumer Finances https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm; Census Bureau data http: //www.census.gov/main/www/access.html; iMoneyNet data https://www.mfanalyzer.com/ 4 See also Becker [2007] for a discussion on the degree to which deposit markets are geographically segmented and the appropriateness of MSA as a well-defined geographic deposit market. Note: Distance is a weighted-average distance with weights equal to the branch location total deposits reported in SOD at the end of June. Source: RateWatch and Summary of Deposits (FDIC)
Dispersion
To understand the sources of dispersion documented in Figure ( 1), first, let us define the offer rate of the branches of bank j ∈ {1, 2, .., N t }, located in geographic market m ∈ {1, 2, ..., M } in period t as R j,m,t , where N t is the number of banks in period t and M is the number of markets. Next, let us define the overallR t , the bank {R j,t } Nt j=1 , and the market-level {R m,t } M m=1 average offer rates. Then, the total variation in rates at a point in time, defined as the sum of squared deviations of each bank rate from the overall mean W t = m,j (R j,m,t −R t ) 2 , can be decomposed in two ways
(R j,m,t −R j,t ) 
The first decomposition is the sum of within-bank variation across different markets and variation in average offer rates across different banks. Analogously, the second decomposition breaks down total variation into within and across-markets variation. Table ( 2) shows that more than 90 % of the overall variation in rates can be attributed to differences in rates across banks, and less than 10 % can be attributed to differences in rates of the same bank across different markets. Similarly, the market based decomposition shows that most of the total variation is due to dispersion in rates across banks within the same market, and less than 20 % of variation in rates is due to differences in median rates across markets. To measure the economic significance of rate dispersion, the first four columns of Table   ( 3) show the quartiles and the weighted averages of the median rates across markets and for different maturities. The last four columns present the same summary statistics for the difference between the 95th and the 5th percentiles of rates within markets. Compared to the median rate, within-market rate dispersion is economically significant. For example, the weighted average 12-month rate is 375 basis points whereas the range of rates between the 95th and the 5th percentiles is as high as 222 basis points. An investor starting with an offer in the 5th percentile, can gain $ 222 in interest income on every $ 10,000, if she could identify and deposit at the bank in the 95th percentile. Although the median rate increases and rate dispersion decreases with maturity, incentives to search are even higher for longer maturities. For the 5-year CD, the weighted-average within-market difference between the 95th and the 5th percentiles implies an overall gain in interest payments of $ 765 on every $ 10,000. Note: † Weighted-mean across markets with weights equal to the total deposits in the market. Source: RateWatch and Summary of Deposits (FDIC)
Pass-through and monopoly power
Banks' monopoly power is large, time-varying, and increasing with higher market rates.
This fact is illustrated in Figure ( 2) which plots the spread over 3-month Treasury and a measure of dispersion for the 3-month CD against the level of the target Federal funds rate. In the high interest rate environments of 1997-2000 and 2006-07 , when the target Federal funds rate is five percentage points or higher, the average spread on the 3-month CD is negative 100 basis points or lower, and the difference between the 95th and the 5th percentiles exceeds 150 basis points. 5 These negative spreads translate into sizable profits. For example, based on the outstanding amounts on banks' balance sheets and the corresponding spreads over Treasuries, collectively banks earned at least $15 billion in profits from time deposits alone or 11 percent of their total net income in 2006 as compared to a situation in which time deposits were priced at Treasury rates. 6 This calculation is a lower bound as 5 An incomplete pass-through in deposit rates is present to an even higher degree for other deposit categories such as savings and interest checking accounts as documented by Driscoll and Judson [2013] and Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl [2017] .
6 Most time deposits have remaining maturity below one year which justifies the treatment of outstanding it does not take into account the fact that time deposits likely fund much higher yielding assets than Treasuries.
Rigidity
The negative correlation of deposit spreads and the positive correlation of dispersion with the level of the Federal funds rate are a direct consequence of an asymmetric rigidity of rate adjustments. While, deposit rates adjust relatively flexibly when the target Federal funds rate decreases, adjustments are rigid in periods when the target increases. This fact is summarized in Table ( 4) which shows the quartiles of durations between rate adjustments observed across banks for three regimes of monetary policy: decreasing, constant, and increasing target Federal funds rate. Target  decreased  constant  increased  p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75  3-month  0  3  11  1  7  20  1  6  16  6-month  0  2  7  2  6  17  2  5  12  12-month  0  2  6  1  5  15  1  5  11  24-month  0  2  6  1  5  14  1  5  12  60-month  0  1  5  0  3  12  0  3  12 Note: Durations are measured in weeks. The sample period is 1-January-1997 -30-June-2011.
Source: RateWatch
The Median duration of rate adjustments is 6 weeks during periods of increasing target, slightly lower than the 7 weeks during periods when the target remains unchanged. In contrast, when the target decreases, the median duration is 3 weeks. All maturities display asymmetric adjustments. However, longer maturities are more flexible in all three regimes.
A further observation from this table is fact that rate adjustments vary considerably among banks. Some banks adjust their rates quite flexibly while others adjust even more rigidly.
For example, the 75th percentile bank kept its rates on 3 month CDs unchanged for as long as 16 weeks during monetary policy tightening, while the 25th percentile bank adjusted deposit rate with a lag of one week.
Although all banks face the same aggregate shocks related to variation in market interest rates, there is little synchronization in deposit rate adjustments. During periods of tightening, the median fraction of adjusters is around 12 percent, only slightly higher than amounts as flows over an annual horizon.
the 11 percent in periods of constant target Federal funds rate. This fraction increases to 20 percent during periods of monetary policy easing. Unlike the durations of rate adjustments, synchronization of rate adjustments are about the same across maturities. The heterogeneity and lack of synchronization of rate adjustments across banks constantly changes the ranking of banks' offers even as many banks keep their rates unchanged. Therefore, to identify the best rates investors cannot rely on past information and need to conduct search.
The pricing of deposits resembles that of retail goods. For example, Lach [2002] documents that the pricing of homogeneous retail goods in Israel exhibits persistent price dispersion and constant repositioning of shops' price rankings. Similarly, Kaplan and Menzio [2015] present evidence based on U.S. household-level transactions data that there is persistent price dispersion even for identical retail goods across stores and over time within the same store. They also document heterogeneity in shopping behavior across different households based on age and employment status reflecting heterogeneity in search costs based on marginal value of time.
Demand for certificates of deposit
Given the high dispersion in rates, do households search for better return on their savings?
Is search distinct from other characteristics such as risk aversion, degree of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, planning horizon, use of financial advisor, and overall financial sophistication? Household demand for and investments in CDs offer a laboratory to disentangle those different aspects of savings behavior. A certificate of deposit is a relatively simple financial instrument that has undergone little financial innovation over the years. Therefore, it requires little financial sophistication to evaluate the desirability of the offer of one bank over another. With deposit insurance, the decision should be entirely based on the offered rate. However, if there are costs of acquiring information on offer rates at different banks, households would not necessarily be able to pick the best return on their savings. Even if a household could observe all relevant information, they could still decide to stick with their main bank if transaction and convenience costs are too high to open an account with another bank.
To summarize the various aspects of financial sophistication, I construct a financial sophistication score using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The surveys collect information on households' financial decisions and resulting portfolios. The score is calculated as the first principal component of a set of quantitative and qualitative characteristics of households. The set of variables included are: Excellent understanding of the SCF questions; Reliance on advice from a financial professional; Willingness to undertake above average financial risks; Financial budgeting horizon exceeding 5 years; Direct ownership of stocks or stock mutual funds; Ownership of a brokerage account; Ownership of money market mutual funds or other mutual funds; Diversity of asset holdings. Table (6) provides summary statistics for households grouped by the quartiles of the financial sophistication score from the lowest in column 1 to the highest in column 3. As a comparison, column 4 examines the group of households who own a CD and column 5 shows the characteristics of the average household in the survey.
High financial sophistication households are slightly older, twice as likely to have a college degree, have substantially higher average incomes and net worth, and earn a higher share of their income from financial assets. 7 By construction of the score, those households have excellent understanding of the SCF questionnaire, have more diverse portfolios of financial assets, hold higher shares of risky assets such as stocks and corporate bonds, and are more willing to take above-average financial risks.
In comparison, households who invest in CDs are near retirement age and 10 years older than the average. Even though some CD holders have high sophistication scores, the average for this group is around the median of the score distribution. While CD holders have higher incomes and net-worth than average, they are much less wealthy than the high sophistication group. CD holders are also significantly less likely to take above average financial risks and hold much higher share of their financial assets in deposits. Only a fifth of these households report preference for great deal of shopping for investment return which is about the same as the average. In addition, only a quarter of CD holders report using the Internet for investment decisions compared to close to half of investors in the high group.
The results from this analysis lead to the conclusion that the preference for search for higher return is distinct from financial sophistication. Furthermore, different investors have different preferences for search technology-most notably the use of the Internet. 1  2  2  2  2  Take above average financial risks  5  25  50  20  21  Budgeting horizon over 5 years  13  50  72  47  40  Great deal shopping for investment  17  23  22  23  21  Use Internet for investment decisions  21  32  46  25  30  Use professional investment advice  24  46  54  50  40  Excellent understanding of SCF  36  52  71  53  48  Financial Sophistication Index percentile 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5
Note: Columns 1 through 3 present the averages for the households belonging to the lowest quartile, the interquartile range, and the highest quartile of the financial sophistication index, respectively. Column (4) presents averages for the group of households who own a certificate of deposit (CD). Column (5) presents averages for the full sample. All averages are weighted with the survey sampling weights. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 2007 The notion that search is a distinct activity is collaborated by evidence in Honka, Hortaçsu, and Vitorino [2016] . They use confidential survey data to breakdown shopping for deposit rates into distinct stages-an awareness phase, a search phase, and choice phase. On average, households are aware of close to 7 banks operating in their local geographic market and examine offers of at least 2 banks. Consistent with active search, Honka, Hortaçsu, and Vitorino [2016] document that 52 percent of consumers end up choosing the bank with the highest interest rate while 31 percent of consumers choose the second highest interest rate bank. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19 Note: The size of the circle presents the relative amount of the allocation based on the survey weights and deposit amounts. In the public version of SCF, the number of CD contracts and the number of institutions are top coded at 20 and 10, respectively. Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 2007 Search for better return implies that depositors should be willing to buy CDs from banks different from their main checking account bank. According to Figure (3) , this indeed appears to be the case for many households in the SCF. While most households hold one CD with a single bank, about 45 percent invest in a CD with a bank different from their main checking account bank. In addition, around 20 percent of households hold multiple CDs with more than one bank.
An additional reason for having multiple accounts with different banks is the FDIC insurance limit. If an investor's total deposits at a bank exceed the limit, she faces the credit risk of the bank for the uninsured portion. Opening additional accounts with different banks allows to diversify this credit risk as each new account is insured up to the limit. For example, an investor with $500,000 in a single bank account will have half of that amount uninsured. By opening and placing $250,000 in a second bank, a depositor can achieve Note: A probit regression on an indicator whether a household owns certificates of deposit with more than one bank or with a bank different from their main checking account bank. The survey provided weights are used as regression weights. Source: Survey of Consumer Finance full deposit insurance. 8 Even in the case of households looking to place large deposits in multiple banks to increase insurance coverage, they should optimally choose banks offering higher rates.
To disentangle the two motives for multiple deposit accounts, Table (7) presents results from a probit regression on whether a household owns CDs with one or several banks different from their main checking account bank. Households with total deposits exceeding the deposit insurance limit are indeed more likely to hold CDs with multiple banks, and, up to 2004, less likely to hold multiple accounts if they have a joint account which increases the effective coverage. 9 The results are consistent with the limited deposit insurance motive.
Conditioning on this motive, higher financial sophistication and the preference for shopping a great deal for investment returns both increase the likelihood that a household buys CDs from multiple banks. The use of the Internet for investment decisions only appears significant in the 2013 survey. It indicates that more tech savvy households are more likely to have multiple deposit accounts, likely reflecting both lower search costs and also lower transaction costs of maintaining multiple accounts with different banks. 
Model
Banks compete for deposits by announcing simultaneously their offer rates. Deposit insurance rules out bank runs as in Diamond and Dybvig [1983] . In case of a bank failure, a deposit insurance fund subsidized by the government covers the whole amount of the deposit contract including the accrued interest.
Depositors

Consumption-savings decision
Each period a unit mass of investors enters the market for time deposits with A 0 liquid wealth stored in a checking account with a bank. Depositors choose how much assets to leave in a liquid checking account which yields utility through funding current consumption c 0 , and how much to save A τ to fund consumption in some future period τ ≥ 1. The optimal consumption-savings problem is
subject to:
where utility takes the following constant elasticity of substitution form
The utility specification depends on three parameters: discount factor 0 < β < 1; relative risk-aversion γ > 0; and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) σ > 0. If an investor invests in a risky asset, her wealth and consumption are stochastic and ([E(c
captures the certainty equivalent of a risky-asset lottery.
Proposition 1
The solution of the consumption-savings problem takes the following closed
The marginal propensity to consume h τ (R) is
• for a risky asset with log-normal returns log(
Indirect utility is linear in financial wealth
where marginal utility of wealth
Proof The results are straightforward to show and rely on the homogeneity of degree one of the utility function If σ exceeds one, then the substitution effect dominates the income effect and the marginal propensity to consume is decreasing in the interest rate. Conversely, if σ < 1, the income effect dominates and the marginal propensity to consume is increasing in R.
Costly search
Although investors are aware of the offer distribution, they have no prior information about the specific rates of each bank. 10 Information gathering is costly as each depositor faces search cost ξ ≥ 0 per bank offer. Search costs are distributed among investors according to a known population distribution F ξ (ξ) over a range [0, ∞) . Investors search non-sequentially by optimally choosing a fixed sample of bank offers. 11 The first offer is costless which ensures that there is full participation even for depositors with very high search costs. The total search cost for a sample of n offers is (n − 1) × ξ.
Let us define the highest rate in a random sample of n rates as R max (n). The cumulative probability function of R max (n) is P r(R max (n) ≤ R) = F R (R) n . It is easy to show that the 10 The assumption that an investor knows the distribution of offers is rather strong. Rothschild [1974] relaxes this assumption and shows that optimal search strategies under unknown price distribution are qualitatively similar to strategies when the price distribution is known. However, Koulayev [2013] shows that not accounting for the uncertainty in price distribution could result in biases in search cost estimates.
11 The assumption of non-sequential search could be justified by the presence of economies of scale of search. Also recent evidence in De los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest [2012] shows that the non-sequential fixed sample search model better describes actual search behavior. Morgan and Manning [1985] derive conditions under which different modes of search are optimal.
expected value of R max (n) is increasing in the sample size n, while its variance is decreasing in n. Optimal search selects the sample size that maximizes the expected utility
where search costs enter linearly in the utility and are assumed proportional to wealth A 0 .
Optimal search is determined by a trade-off between the disutility of search captured by the search costs and the gains in utility from both a higher expected rate as well as lower uncertainty about the rate when sampling more offers. Let us define the marginal value of information from increasing the sample size by an extra offer given that k offers have been sampled
Integration by parts leads to an equivalent representation
which clearly reveals that the marginal value of information ∆ k is a decreasing sequence in k since F R (R) ≤ 1 and φ () > 0.
We can group investors into segments according to the intensity of their search {q k } N k=1 . Investors with search costs higher than ξ > ∆ 1 optimally choose not to shop for rates and sample only one bank. Investors with search costs in the range ∆ k ≤ ξ < ∆ k−1 examine offers of k banks. Finally, investors with search costs lower than ξ < ∆ N −1 choose to examine the offers of all banks. Given a search cost distribution, we can compute the size of each segment
. . .
Once incurred search costs are sunk and investors can always choose an outside option. I assume full participation and, as shown in the lemma below, this implies that the reservation deposit rate is common to all investors and independent of their idiosyncratic search costs.
Lemma 1 If a randomly drawn deposit rate from the offer distribution F R (R) is preferred to investing in an outside option, then the reservation deposit rate and the choice to participate do not depend on individual search costs.
Proof The results follow from the linearity of the indirect utility with respect to wealth and the zero cost of observing one offer. Let the outside option have indirect utility V 0 while V d 1 be the expected utility from one deposit offer. The indirect utility of optimal search V d n * (ξ) for any search cost ξ weakly dominates V d 1 . The condition for participation can be written as
Participation in the deposit market, therefore, does not depend on the individual search cost ξ.
It is easy to compute that the reservation rate for a log-normally distributed risky asset with expected returnR and return variance ν 2 isṘ =R × e − γ 2 ×ν 2 . I do not take a stance on what an outside option of a CD investment is. However, it is useful to point out that the reservation rate for a risky asset likely depends on the expected return and its variance but also on the relative risk aversion of investors. To the extent that CD investors are highly risk-averse, they would accept very low deposit rates.
Deposit demand
Suppose that a bank posts a rate R above the reservation rateṘ. Investors who sample k offers choose this bank's offer if the other k − 1 offers are inferior. The probability of this event is F R (R) k−1 . Since each bank is sampled randomly, the individual bank demand from the segment with search intensity k is (1 − h(R)) k N F R (R) k−1 q k . Summing over all market segments and normalizing aggregate wealth to one, deposit demand is
A bank's deposit demand is composed of two elements-an intensive margin which determines how much is saved and an extensive margin which determines the mass of depositors a bank is expected to attract with an offer rate R.
Deposit pricing
The marginal cost of fundsR is assumed common to all banks. The Federal Reserve directly controls the interest on reserves and determines to a large extent the effective rate at which banks borrow and lend at interbank markets. 12 Let us define ψ(R,R)
to be the profit per captured depositor, then the deposit profit is
To price deposits, banks follow symmetric mixed strategies as in Burdett and Judd [1983] .
In this equilibrium, every bank is indifferent between posting any rate along the support S = [R min , R max ] of an equilibrium offer rate distribution. In expectation, banks earn equal nonzero profits and any rate outside the equilibrium support leads to strictly lower profit
In order to sustain equal profits, the following trade-off is at work. Higher rates generate lower profits per captured depositor but attract a larger mass of investors. The two effects exactly offset each other in equilibrium. On one hand, even if a bank posts the highest offer rate, it would not capture the entire market as only a fraction of investors observes this rate. On the other hand, banks that offer the lowest rate still attract depositors-those with high search costs q 1 who choose to sample only one offer and happen to be unlucky to obtain this low rate.
The lower bound of the support of the equilibrium distribution is the largest between the monopoly rate R m = argmax R ψ(R,R) and the reservation rate, R min = max{Ṙ, R m }.
A bank would not post a rate lower than the reservation rate or the monopolistic deposit rate, as it would either attract no depositors or fail to fully maximize profits. The upper bound of the support is derived as follows.
Lemma 2
The maximum rate that a bank would post in equilibrium is
Proof In equilibrium, profits at the two ends of the support of the distribution must be equal π(R max ) = π(R min ). Using this equality, one can solve for R max . A unique solution is guaranteed by the fact that ψ(R,R) is a monotone decreasing function in R.
The degree of monopoly power is determined by the share of high search cost investors q 1 .
To see this, let us examine the ratio of the mark-ups over marginal costs for the two ends of the supportR
Intensive margin
If all investors consider only one offer q 1 = 1, then the offer rate distribution is degenerate at the monopoly price equilibrium R max = max{Ṙ, R m }. This is consistent with the so called "Diamond paradox" described in Diamond [1971] . If all investors observe only one rate, banks can sustain monopoly equilibrium by charging the monopoly rate. Since there is no price dispersion, investors have no incentives to search which confirms the equilibrium.
This equilibrium is overwhelmingly ruled out by the data.
Alternatively, if the share of the uninformed investors is zero q 1 = 0, then each investor observes and compares rates from at least two banks. In this environment, each bank competes in prices with at least one more bank and has incentives to enter into a Bertrand competition. The offer rate distribution becomes degenerate at R min =R. However, this is not an equilibrium outcome as the lack of price dispersion does not rationalize the existence of costly search to begin with. Hence, q 1 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
For a dispersed price equilibrium to exist, there should be some investors who examine only one offer 0 < q 1 < 1, and others who sample more than one offer q k > 0 for some k = 2, 3, .., N . We can characterize the dispersed price equilibrium as the sub-game perfect equilibrium in symmetric mixed strategies.
is a dispersed equilibrium if for a given distribution of investor types F ξ (ξ), reservation rateṘ, and marginal costR: a) Given an equilibrium distribution of offer rates
is a solution to the optimal consumption-savings and search problems of investors in which some investors observe only one deposit offer 0 < q 1 < 1, while others observe and compare k offers q k ≥ 0 for some k = 2, 3, .., N . b) F R (R), R min , R max , π * is a deposit pricing equilibrium in symmetric mixed strategies given optimal consumption-savings and non-sequential search. The mixed strategies equilibrium distribution F R (R) is implicitly defined by the indifference condition (13).
The model differs from the original Burdett-Judd model along two dimensions-search costs are heterogeneous and demand is price-elastic. 13 The elasticity of demand is determined
13 Reinganum [1979] shows that, in the presence of homogeneous search costs, heterogeneity in marginal costs and price-elastic demand are sufficient for a dispersed equilibrium. Unlike the model of Reinganum [1979] , banks are assumed to have a common marginal cost and consumers have heterogeneous search costs.
by σ. We can show that even with consumer search cost heterogeneity and the presence of interest-elastic demand, the equilibrium rate distribution has the same properties as in the case of homogeneous search costs and unit demand of Burdett and Judd [1983] .
Proposition 2 Given consumer search characterized by {q k } N k=1 such that 0 < q 1 < 1, there exists a unique offer distribution F R (R) which is a solution to the equilibrium condition (13).
F R (R) is continuous and with connected support.
Proof To show uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution F R (R), we need to examine the equilibrium condition (13). The equilibrium profit for any offer rate R ∈ [R min , R max ] must equal the profit achieved at the minimum rate R min . We can express this condition as
Note that the left-hand side is monotone increasing function in F R and the right hand side is a monotone increasing function in R as (R − R)(1 − h d (R)) is a monotone decreasing function in R. Therefore, there exists a monotone increasing function Φ(·) such that
The rest of the results follow from slight modification of arguments in Burdett and Judd [1983] Although Proposition (2) guarantees the existence of a unique offer distribution given search behavior, for this offer distribution to be an equilibrium, we need to also verify that search behavior is consistent with it. Search behavior is determined by the distribution of search costs and the critical search cost thresholds
R (z) allows us to express the indifference points (8) as
With some abuse of notation, let us define∆ N = sup{ξ : F ξ (ξ) = 0} and ∆ 0 = inf{ξ :
The system of equations (18) and (19) is a mapping between the unknown search cost distribution evaluated at the critical points {∆ k } N −1 k=1 and the observed offer rate distribution F R (R). Solving this system of non-linear equations using global numerical methods leads to unique solutions for most parameterizations of the search cost distribution and the coefficient of intertemporal substitution. 14 4 Model estimation
Maximum likelihood estimation
The dispersed equilibrium implies a likelihood of observing a particular offer rate given an underlying search cost distribution, IES, marginal cost, and reservation rate of depositors.
Proposition 3
The model implies a well-defined likelihood of observing a deposit offer rate
where the equilibrium offer rate distribution F R (R) is implicitly defined in (16), and Θ = F ξ (·), σ,R,Ṙ are primitives of the model.
Proof The probability density function is derived by applying the implicit function theorem to equation (16). For σ < 2, the derivative of the profit function is negative ψ (R) < 0 which guarantees that the likelihood is non-negative.
Following Hong and Shum [2006] and Moraga-González and Wildenbeest [2008] , one can obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the market segments
where
14 Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest [2017] apply the Brouwer fixed point theorem to show that an equilibrium exists in a Burdett-Judd model with heterogeneous search cost consumers. They show uniqueness under a specific parameterization of the search cost distribution and draw the conclusion that the lack of uniqueness in the original Burdett-Judd model is likely due to the homogeneity of search costs. Deriving the conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium in this model is beyond the scope of this paper.
The marginal cost of funds is derived from the equilibrium indifference condition π(R min ) = π(R max ) and plugged into the likelihood functioñ
The estimation starts with the support of the equilibrium offer distribution. The minimum and maximum offer rates are estimated with their sample equivalents R min = min{R j,m,t } N j=1
and R max = max{R j,m,t } N j=1 . 15 Given a set of estimates { q k } N k=1 , the indifference points of the search cost distribution
k=1 are computed using (18) . The values of the cumulative density function of the search cost distribution at those points are solved from (10)
The upper percentiles of the search cost distribution are identified up to ∆ 1 . Therefore, higher percentiles are extrapolated using non-decreasing Hermite polynomials.
Estimation of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
The coefficient of intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ is estimated independently from the search cost distribution using the relationship A τ = (1 − h(R))A 0 . Taking derivatives with respect to the deposit rate and using the fact that
, one arrives at an empirical specification which relates the growth in time deposits to the growth in rates
where Note: The instrumental variable (IV) regressions use two instrumental variables and their lags. The first set is the current and lagged value of the unexpected component of changes in the target Federal funds rate identified from the Federal funds futures market following Kuttner [2001] . The second is the second lag of the growth rate in time deposits. Standard errors are based on Newey and West [1987] heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator.
time deposits, therefore, is an intertemporal choice equivalent to postponement of current consumption and relaxation of cash-in-advance constraints in future periods.
Estimates of the IES are presented in Table ( 8) . The regressions use the 6-month and the 12-month CD rates. The first two columns present the OLS estimates of σ and the last two columns use an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Since the growth in time deposits and the change in deposit rates are jointly determined, the IV regressions use exogenous variation in deposit rates coming from unexpected movements in the target Federal funds rate identified from the Federal funds futures following Kuttner [2001] . A second instrument is the second lag of the growth in time deposits. The estimates of σ from all specifications are statistically larger than one and lower than two. These estimates imply that the substitution effect dominates the income effect. The marginal propensity to save is increasing in the rate while the marginal utility of wealth is increasing and concave in rates.
Structural estimates
The search cost distribution is estimated using data from 234 Metropolitan Statistical Areas Marginal cost R Maximal rate R max 12−month LIBOR Note: The figure plots deposit-weighted average estimate of the model implied marginal cost of funds computed from equation (23) as well as the deposit-weighted estimate of the maximum rate for the 12-month CD. These estimates are contrasted with the 12-month USD LIBOR rate.
Goodness-of-fit
I use the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the model. The KS test is based on the maximal difference between the empirical distribution and the model generated evaluated at the MLE estimates. KS test statistic is computed for each MSA market and each period. According to p-values from this test, the model generated distribution is statistically close to the empirical for most of the MSA markets throughout the sample period. One fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality at 5 percent significance level for the majority of markets and the deposit-weighted average pvalue exceeds 25 percent in all years of the sample. I focus the analysis on markets with p-values exceeding 5 percent. This excludes between 0 and at most 8 mostly small markets.
A further somewhat indirect test of the goodness-of-fit is presented in Figure ( 5) which plots the estimate of the marginal cost of fundsR along with the 12-month LIBOR rate and the weighed-average maximum rate. Remarkably, the model implied marginal cost tracks very closely the LIBOR rate. On average, however, the marginal cost estimate is slightly higher than LIBOR. The model estimates reflect higher marginal costs of smaller banks in the sample which are likely to face higher costs of accessing external finance in wholesale funding markets.
Estimates of search intensity and search costs
The estimates of the market segments {q k } N k=1 vary across markets and over time. resulting from changes in rate dispersion. As ∆ 1 increases a mass of inactive investors find it worthwhile to search for rates and compare rates of two banks. Note: The monthly structural estimates are aggregated to annual averages for each market and merged with annual SOD data and Census demographic and income data. Wherever applicable variables are expressed as percentage points. All panel regressions include MSA market fixed effects. Standard errors are based on a robust variance-covariance matrix estimator with MSA level clustering (See Arellano [1987] ).
The remainder 20 percent are active investors who search more than two banks. Of those, the largest segment is the lowest search cost segment q N with search costs ξ < ∆ N −1 .
Over the sample period from 1997 to 2007, this segment gradually decreases from around 10 percent to less than 5 percent. In lockstep with q N , the average fraction of banks sampled also gradually decreases from around 20 percent to 10 percent.
Figure (6) reveals sizable differences across markets in the share of inactive investors. In 2006, the 5th percentile market has only 10 percent of inactive investors, while for the 95th percentile this share is above 50 percent. Table (9) examines how market characteristics such as the competitive structure, demographic composition, incomes, and deposit wealth relate to search intensities. Two sets of regressions with market fixed-effects are estimated for q 1 , q 2 , and q N each. The first regression does not condition on rate dispersion whereas the second does. With the exception of q N , controlling for rate dispersion makes measures of market concentration such as the HHI and the number of banks and branches per capita statistically insignificant.
Even after conditioning on rate dispersion, the share of elderly households of age 65 and above continues to play economically large and statistically significant role in determining search intensity across markets. A higher share of this population is correlated with higher share of inactive investors q 1 and a lower share of active investors q N with no effect on q 2 when conditioning on rate dispersion. In addition to the share of elderly households, larger population size is also related to a higher share of inactive investors. In contrast, markets with higher incomes and higher deposit-to-income ratios have lower share of inactive investors q 1 and higher shares of investors who compare two bank offers. Markets with wealthier households are more likely to involve investors for whom the limited deposit insurance motive is a concern.
To understand the apparent dichotomy in the population of investors between inactive q 1 investors and those that sample two q 2 or all banks q N , we need to first examine the variation in the marginal values of information for different sample sizes {∆ k } N −1 k=1 and over time. Since {∆ k } N −1 k=1 are expressed in utils, I convert them into interest rate equivalents. An interest rate equivalent expresses the marginal value of information as the increase in the expected best offer rate starting from a sample size k and a particular reference rate. For R min as reference rate, the interest rate equivalent ∆(R min ) k for sample size k is a solution
Since φ (R) < 0, the interest rate equivalent evaluated at R min is the lowest than any other reference rate. The range of search costs and the shape of the search cost distribution are identified up to ∆ 1 and the corresponding cumulative density F ξ (∆ 1 ). For search costs larger ξ > ∆ 1 , the search cost distribution is extrapolated using monotone Hermite splines. Incorporating the heterogeneity in the estimates of ∆ 1 and F ξ (∆ 1 ) across markets improves identification of the upper range and shape of the aggregate search cost distribution. Figure ( Internet use by age groups. In particular, the 2010 survey shows that only 41 percent of elderly households of age 65 and above use a personal computer, and only 32 percent of these elderly households use the Internet. 16 This result is also confirms the facts in Table   ( 6), which documents that only a quarter of CD holders use the Internet to search for investment information, half as much as the usage reported by sophisticated investors. To the extent that elderly households constitute the bulk of the high search cost investors and are the largest segment investing in CD, the low adoption rate of the Internet contributed to the relatively unchanged search cost distributions. 
Effect on money markets
Another effect of differential adoption of information technologies not captured explicitly by the model is compositional. Although the model assumes full participation, investors can choose higher yielding investments other than CDs. With the introduction of the Internet, it became easier for more sophisticated investors to move money in and out of their checking accounts into non-deposit products such as mutual funds or brokerage accounts. As a result, even though the overall search and transaction costs may have significantly declined for younger and more sophisticated households, those households are also more likely to have exited the CD market for higher yielding alternatives.
The changing composition of CD investors towards less active elderly households further reinforces the exit of more active and sophisticated investors. Faced with a large mass of high search cost investors, banks are able to charge higher monopoly mark-ups reducing the incentives of active and sophisticated investors to participate in the CD market. Exit of low search cost investors from the CD market is corroborated by results in Hortaçsu and Syverson [2004] who document an increase in the fee dispersion and proliferation of S&P 500 index funds over the period 1995-2000. They attribute these trends to entry of novice investors with high search costs. Although their focus is on S&P 500 index funds, they document similar patterns of high fee dispersion in the retail money market mutual funds (MMF). MMFs compete with banks by providing access to a relatively safe and high interest-earning alternative to bank deposits. 17 The exit of more sophisticated investors from the market for time deposits into MMFs could explain why advances in information technology surprisingly left the CD market intact. It could also explain the pricing of mutual funds documented in Hortaçsu and Syverson [2004] . The low information cost investors who exit the market for time deposits are the novice relatively high-search-cost investors in the more sophisticated and complex mutual fund markets.
Such hypothesis is not without empirical support. For example, Christoffersen and Musto [2002] provide evidence that money market mutual funds exploit the heterogeneity in price elasticities of investors to price discriminate between investors who withdraw from funds that increase fees and those who remain inactive. To the extent that these price elasticities are related to search costs, an inflow of novice investors in the MMF market presents an opportunity for retail MMFs to exploit a potentially less price elastic segment.
To test this hypothesis, I examine bank-affiliated MMFs. These are money funds that are advised, managed, and sponsored by major bank holding companies. 18 Table (10) shows 17 In fact, the MMF industry developed as a response to Regulation Q during the high-inflation period of the late 1970s when the ceiling on the deposit rates started to bind and investors were looking for alternatives. Since the 1970s banks have started to lose deposits to MMFs. This process continued in the post-Regulation Q era.
18 Kacperczyk and Schnabl [2013] document that many bank-affiliated funds received support from their that in 2006 more than $300 billion of the $900 billion retail MMFs are in bank-affiliated funds. Bank-affiliated funds attract investors through distributional channels heavily dependent on the bank adviser and much less so on unaffiliated brokers or direct channels.
In contrast, unaffiliated MMFs attract their investors either directly or through non-bank affiliated brokers and advisers. To the extent that the composition of distributional channels reveals that banks are steering some depositors to their affiliated funds, we should also observe differences in the fees charged by those fund. Indeed, bank-affiliated funds charge on average 10 basis points higher fees as compared to unaffiliated funds. The difference is even larger for direct investments. The dispersion in fees is also much smaller for unaffiliated funds relying on direct distributional channels. For example, for bank-affiliated funds, the difference between the 95th and the 5th percentile is 137 basis points, whereas for unaffiliated funds this difference is 63 basis points. dispersion is also similar between the bank-affiliated and unaffiliated funds. The reason for these differences is that Institutional funds are comprised of large investors with investments exceeding $1 million. For those funds, fee differentials of just a few basis points translate into large differences in returns. Even though fees are significantly lower than retail funds, there is still sizable fee dispersion. The dispersion may reflect differences in asset composition within prime funds and other product differentiation discussed in Hortaçsu and Syverson [2004] . Even with this fee dispersion, on an asset-weighted basis institutional investors invested in cheaper funds and paid significantly lower fees as compared to retail investors.
Conclusion
By 1986 interest rate ceilings on most deposits had been repealed, and banks were allowed to offer competitive rates. Subject to deposit insurance, time deposits are nominally riskless, homogeneous fixed-income financial product that is comparable to Treasuries. As a result, the post interest-rate-ceiling period should have brought convergence of retail deposit rates to market rates. Yet this paper documents persistent rate dispersion and sizable negative spreads over matched maturity Treasuries, indicating significant monopoly power in a market with large number of competitors and available substitutes such as retail money market mutual funds.
Banks achieved the surprising feat of retaining and expanding their monopoly power in the face of competition from money market funds and the advent of information technologies that should have reduced information gathering and other transaction costs. This paper has shown that a model with heterogeneous search cost investors can provide a coherent framework to rationalize the observed monopoly power, the resulting rate dispersion, and asymmetric pass-through of changes in the target Federal funds rate into deposits rates.
Understanding the mechanism behind banks' monopoly power is important beyond deposit markets. Contemporaneous work by Duffie and Krishnamurthy [2016] and Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl [2017] shows that incomplete interest pass-through has a first-order effect on monetary policy transmission through banks' balance sheets and on the efficiency of other money markets.
This paper shows that through affiliation with money market mutual funds the largest banks have expended their span-of-control in the market for money-like instruments to capture sophisticated and active investors whom banks steer into their affiliated funds.
This allowed banks to segment the demand for riskless assets into a segment of inactive high search cost depositors who invest predominantly in deposits and a segment of active investors who choose other more complex and higher yielding financial instruments. The segment of high search cost depositors was predominantly elderly households who are more risk-averse and have been slow to adopt the new information technologies to improve the return on their savings.
Given the sizable estimated search costs, coupled with estimates of relatively high intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the increase in monopoly power reveals potentially sizable welfare losses and distortions in saving behavior of U.S. households that exacerbate wealth inequality. Analysis of the effects of those distortions on aggregate savings behavior is of high policy importance. For example, McKay [2013] finds that privatization of social security can lead to sizable welfare losses in a market where households face search costs.
